

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4

19 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: PRM-10 Force Posture Study from DoD

General Concept: I sensed inadequate attention in the draft paper to the following areas:

- a. Possibility of conflict in the Middle East.
- b. Peacetime competition for the perception of men's minds.
- c. The peacetime competition in the areas of the world other than East Asia and Europe - what may well be the areas of greatest competition in the years ahead since there is a general stalemate in East Asia and Western Europe. Whether or not military force is applicable to the possibility of expanding competition in the non-East Asia/Europe areas seems to deserve consideration.
- d. The impact of the nuclear balance on world perceptions.
- e. Conflict or competition in East Asia without corresponding competition/conflict in Western Europe. In other words,

[REDACTED] If so, I would believe we need to keep a military capability in the area.

25X6

- f. Alternatives to military force to achieve some of our objectives - e.g., Persian Gulf Oil - don't we have alternatives of greater stockpiling and long-term attrition against the Soviet submarine/bomber forces which might attack that shipping rather than direct protection of it, e.g., dealing with major force asymmetries is not only a question of what strategic

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4

-2-

forces we have, but what type they are, how we talk about them, etc., whereas substrategy (4) in Annex E only addresses this in terms of U.S. superiority.

- g. Our role in PRM-10, based on this paper: it seems to me we begin by separating the strategic issues from the conventional.
- (1) Strategic - don't we need to come up with a menu of what we anticipate Soviet strategic capabilities will be in the next decade with and without success itself, e.g., what will the Soviet hard-target complex look like and against which our strategic force posture must be gauged?
  - (2) Conventional.
    - (a) Europe - don't we need a position on what Warsaw Pact capabilities are likely to be, against which the gradations in NATO capability can be gauged?
    - (b) East Asia - don't we need to estimate what the potential threat to the Philippines, Korea, Okinawa and Japan are, based on a purely military assumption, and perhaps even the potential of the Soviets to attack the Chinese, or vice versa?
    - (c) Peacekeeping in local wars: Don't we need to make an estimate of what the Soviet capabilities are for extending their influence to the peacetime use of forces and/or for military intervention, in areas noncontiguous to the Soviet Union?



STANSFIELD TURNER

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4

**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4

19 MAY 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

1. Attached is a Memo for the Record developed by [ ] on the strategic balance. The Secretary of Defense gave it to me with a suggestion that we might want to pick up some of the work suggested in the memo. He most specifically was interested in our looking at the impact of the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union on their strategic programs.

25X1

2. It looks to me like an excellent assessment and work package. I think we should look at it carefully. I am particularly interested in the question of technological advantage and how the directions in which we may be forced to go will favor either us or the Soviets.

3. I am also impressed by the fact that [ ] talks in several places about the impact on the "public audience" of the Secretary of Defense's understanding and statements in this area. I continue to think that we too have a role to play here, since we are obviously less likely to be biased.

25X1

4. I am also very interested in the third party perceptions area. This may or may not be suitable for tasking to intelligence collectors. A study such as ARPA is reputed to be doing may be better but I'm not sure that we couldn't help also.

5. I'd appreciate your views and/or a discussion with your and DDI's principal strategic analyst.

25X1

 [ ]  
STANSFIELD TURNER

cc DDI

Enc.

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2005/11/23 : CIA-RDP80B01554R003400190014-4